In recent years international relations theorists have analyzed the implications of China as an emerging power. They have also discussed and critiqued a possible conflict – specifically between the world’s sole super power the United States and China as an increasingly prominent great power – which has the potential to shape the face of the political and economic landscape during the 21^st century. Scholars agree that the catalyst for such an unprecedented conflict is none other than Taiwan: a small island located off the coast of China and comprised of roughly 20 million people. But how can such a seemingly insignificant island spark a potentially devastating conflict?

China is an emerging rival both in an economic and political sense. China continues to grow at a rate of 9.5 percent annually, with output doubling essentially every nine years. It therefore becomes only common sense that a stronger China will inevitably affect the interests of the United States sometime in the projected future. This growth of Chinese economic, military, and political power will certainly create friction between China and the United States which is the current hegemon.The question though that remains is: “How much of an impact will this increase in power create?”

To answer this question, history is a good model to extrapolate from. World politics are the most unstable when a rising power confronts the leading status quo power (in this case China). For example, during the eighteenth century Britain challenged France’s power. Britain then became the world’s leader, followed by a rising Germany that desired more influence on the world stage which inevitably led to WWI and WWII. Finally,these worldwide conflicts led to the eventual Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States in which both countries lived in a state of bipolarity. There has always been a “not enough room in this town for the both of us” dynamic which causes rivalries that, fueled by uncertainty, often accelerate specific issues that neither can completely control. In that sense, World War I can be considered to have been triggered, literally, by an assassination in Sarajevo.

Today’s current “trigger” is Taiwan. Many scholars believe that both the United States and China would have an incentive to fight over such a small island for several major reasons. For the Chinese leadership, Taiwan is a touchstone of the communist party’s legitimacy, and China’s long-delayed quest to reenter as one of the world’s great powers would be incomplete until the Chinese flag flies over Taiwan. In this mind-set, a divided nation is still a weak nation. As for the United States, in 2001 George W. Bush promised that the U.S. would do ‘whatever it takes’ to help Taiwan defend itself. American values, history, and concerns about credibility are all at issue over Taiwan. Abandoning Taiwan in its moment of acute need would surely make many around the world question the continued trustworthiness of the United States.

There are a few principal themes that many scholars agree upon, those being: China as an emerging rival (creating tension as the balance of power begins to shift); economic competition (on a global scale, butting up against the hegemonic regime of the U.S.) vs. military opposition (China actively pursuing an increase in arms buildup, technology research, space based support); Taiwan as the great “tinderbox;” and finally China’s belief that it might win a prolonged war because its interest in Taiwan far exceeds that of the U.S. All of this could lead to a conflict that would spiral out of control and effectively magnify the conflict beyond its initial state (your classic security dilemma). This process could lead to a rapid deterioration of diplomacy, escalation of aggressive actions, military buildup, and the incentive for a first strike, or preemptive strike – most likely by the Chinese. The biggest debate is after we have crossed that line, would we also shift from using nuclear weapons as a deterrent strategy to a more active usage on the battlefield? This is the most chilling prospect, as a nuclear exchange between two of the world’s great powers could prove to be a devastating travesty that the entire world would take a long time to recover from.

Many scholars also believe this future scenario highly unlikely to occur. Their first principal argument of why it won’t happen consists of an analysis of China’s rapid rise in the global economy and its desire to have a larger piece of the economic pie, as well as its ever-continuing interdependence with the Untied States and the rest of the global community. Furthermore, aggressive actions taken by China could result in political sanctions from other countries, and loss of a favorable outlook abroad as well. Also, an all-out attack on both the U.S. and Taiwan in an attempt to shock the U.S. into submission and end the war quickly could essentially destroy Taiwan’s infrastructure, and naval blockades would cripple Taiwan’s economy – both prospects unfavorable even by the Chinese whose sole aim is to acquire Taiwan, not destroy it. These and many other factors will deter China from entering into a conflict where it would damage itself not only economically, but politically as well.

Many countries (including the United States to an extent) have regarded the gradual integration of China into the international political system as a force for stability, as opposed to instability. Rather, China’s decision to join the World Trade Organization in 2001, and its integration with the international economy, makes it highly doubtful that China would seek to challenge the balance of the international economic and political system. Moreover, since the end of World War II, very few wars have been fought among democratic countries. This is because the nation-state system appears to have gained enough stability that countries rarely take up arms against each other, and that the character of the modern global economy makes colonialism much less appealing.

There is also good reason for cautious optimism. Since economics is about competition, a certain amount of friction in our relationship is inevitable. Also, inherent difficulties occur when a new power seeks to insert itself into an international system it did not create. However, the odds are good that a mutual accommodation is possible, one that can gain public support in both countries.

For all the mutual dependency and cooperation, however, Washington and Beijing remain uncertain about each other’s intentions. A better approach would be to show somewhat more constraint. In particular, the United States should explicitly state that under no circumstances would it initiate use of nuclear weapons against China, even if hostilities became severe and prolonged, and state further that it expected Beijing to offer a similar pledge.

Communication is critical, and leaders in Taiwan, China, and the United States need to think these issues through thoroughly in advance (rather than trying to avert a crisis when it is too late), in order to avoid escalation in any serious crisis or war that begins. However unlikely an all-out war can occur over Taiwan, the possibility still remains. That is why it is necessary to convey clear intentions without any ambiguities must be of the utmost importance in order to best avoid a confrontation that in their minds should never happen.

Many scholars have a more pragmatic and pessimistic view of China’s current state of economy. They believe that China’s economy faces daunting challenges, and that even if it solves many of its problems, the central government may not have sufficient control over the fruits of growth to use them for military coercion. Even if China were to achieve the highest GNP in the world (originally falsely projected to surpass the U.S. by about this time in the early 21^st century), low per capita wealth would persist, limiting disposable income that could be reallocated to the military.

Furthermore, many scholars say that the projections for the strength of China’s military supremacy are way off. Amongst scholars there is little disagreement that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains a threadbare force, well below Western standards (let alone the U.S. military supremacy). Most personnel are poorly educated and trained, the weapons systems are old, and even those acquired most recently are inferior. However, many seem to forget to consider the unconventional ways in which Beijing could fight a war, in particular utilizing naval blockades and waiting it out, or developing highly advanced cybernetic warfare techniques since the U.S. military relies heavily upon technology and precision strike warfare.

Many also assume too much about the positive effects of globalization, interdependence and political liberalization (their main argument for peace), because they underestimate the role of nationalist emotion and the possibility of misconceptions and inadvertence in war. Moreover, they also forget that interdependence is a two-way street that restrains not only the Chinese, but China’s potential adversaries as well.

International relations theorists would find that you are doomed to repeat history unless you learn from the mistakes of the past. In order to understand where a state such as China is going, you must know where it is coming from (its past, ideology, etc). It often happens that if a state is perceived as evil, or its intentions questionable, then it will become somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy and begin to act as other states perceive it. If we were to approach this issue with a balanced perspective of at least recognizing the issues at stake and the potential crisis in one hand, as well as with an optimistic viewpoint on the other – then our future is not so bleak as many pessimists would have us think. The 21^st century has the potential to be a century of unrivaled economic prosperity and development – the likes of which this world has never seen – which hinges on the cooperation of the United States, China, and all the countries of this world. Truly, a much less bleak and terrifying future and one that we would all prefer.